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Abstract 
Truth commissions (TCs) are government-established bodies that investigate past human 
rights abuses. They address truth, justice and reconciliation in societies that have suffered 
from systematic human rights violations. The truth commissions in South Korea and 
Canada address human rights violations that occurred over a generation ago against their 
citizens. They differ from more traditional TCs in historical scope of the violations, and 
the difficulty of investigation. Despite their robust mandates, civil society’s involvement 
and stable political situation, neither have been successful in creating reconciliation. 
South Korea’s truth seeking efforts have the potential of reconciliation, but the political 
culture and continued tensions with North Korea limit the chance of a wider 
appeasement. Canada’s legally mandated truth commission has successfully involved 
residence school survivors and worked to educate the public. Yet, this addresses only a 
part of the systematic human rights violations suffered by the indigenous populations 
since colonization- violations continue. Reconciliation of historical injustices takes a long 
time since they are not just part of citizens’ memories, but part of the culture and 
education. This paper seeks to demonstrate, with a particular focus on South Korea and 
Canada, the importance of addressing historical human rights violations, and how despite 
their ambitious goals, TCs are often hampered by lack of political will to create real 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
I. Introduction 
Truth and reconciliation commissions are one of several routes governments choose to 
address human rights violations. Earlier commissions, such as those in South Africa 
(1995), Argentina (1983-1984), and Chile (1990), developed methods and best practices 
to deal with severe violations of civil and political rights after political transitions. From 
these experiences, methods of addressing truth, justice, and forgiveness in post-
transitional societies were applied to later transitions. It is important to study the work of 
TCs because they are a useful tool in addressing human rights abuses, but their long-term 
effects are not fully understood. Many studies focus on a few cases, rather than the 
almost forty commissions that have taken place, which impedes a full understanding of 
the capabilities and possibilities for TCs.  
 
Unlike the focus of earlier commissions, some of the commissions from the last ten years 
focus on on-going human rights violations that have influenced contemporary society. 
The commissions in South Korea (2005) and Canada (2009) look at the legacy of human 
rights abuses on their societies. What makes these cases different is that they were not 
founded in the immediate aftermath of conflict or political transition, unlike prior TCs. 
TCs have gradually developed to address civil and political rights violations, as well as 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
South Korea’s second Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2005-2010) investigated 
political and civil violations during the period starting with Japanese colonialism in 1905 
to the political transition of the late 1980s, focusing on civil rights suppression, the 
Korean War and the resulting social and cultural violations. Canada’s on-going Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is investigating 122 years of human rights violations against 
its indigenous population through residential schools that existed from 1874 to 1996 
(Hayner, 2011, p.262). These commissions cover different political, societal and 
historical contexts. Yet, their internal processes share the goal to reconcile and atone for 
human rights violations from the past.  
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Though TCs are useful tools for reconciliation, there are limitations on whether policies 
and actions can be applied to other commissions. The political and historical context, the 
resources at its disposal, and the human rights violations being investigated all impact 
success. These commissions also provide new processes and topics to address. Canada’s 
victim-centered approach includes teaching non-indigenous people about the legacy of 
human-rights abuses. Likewise, South Korea’s commission counters an established 
historical truth. No two TCs are exactly the same, nor can their responses to human rights 
violations be fool proof. 
 
An effective TC is capable of addressing a wide range of recent and historical human 
rights violations and must focus on reconciliation at a societal level to move forward. In 
the previously mentioned cases, the violations have become so deeply rooted in society 
that discovering the truth is not enough. Measures to repair political and social violations 
are important. Successful reconciliatory measures for historical injustices are only 
successful when there is political will and stability. 
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II. Background 
a) Truth Commission Defined 
Despite their prevalence, there still is no broadly accepted definition of a TC (Hayner, 
2011). Many definitions tend to be more of a description. TC’s mandates and powers also 
vary depending on the needs and political realities of the country and violations suffered, 
making a singular definition difficult (Hayner, 2011). In general, they seek to establish 
broader patterns of violations through the social narrative and interpreting that truth 
(Gloppen, 2005). 
 
Defining a TC too narrowly can limit the ability of countries to develop and adapt a 
commission. Despite the possibility of limitations, scholars have attempted to define TCs 
while allowing for a certain degree of flexibility. In general, “truth commissions are 
commissions of inquiry whose primary function is investigation,” and tend to focus on 
severe acts of violence and repression (Freeman, 2006, p.14). Pricilla Hayner, an expert 
in the field of TCs, defines them as: 
1) focused on past, rather than on-going, events; (2) investigates a pattern of 
events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with 
the affected population, gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a 
temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; and (5) is 
officially authorized or empowered by the state under review (Hayner, 2011, 
p.11) 
For Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm a TC is also autonomous, victim-centered and used for 
making recommendations to prevent future abuses (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p.3). Mark 
Freeman (2006) also emphasizes the independence of a TC from the state. Freeman 
further notes that TCs aim to provide “a measure of impartial, historical clarification to 
countervail false or revisionist accounts of the past” (2006, p.39). What these definitions 
have in common is that commissions look to the past, investigate abuses, are temporary, 
make recommendations and are state sanctioned independent bodies. 
 
A peaceful transition from the previous regime or a pacted transition with perpetrators 
still in power influences how the past is addressed (Heine, 2007). According to Jorge 
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Heine (2007), there are three conditions for transitional measures. First, an opening due 
to pressure allows for greater maneuvering. Second, the actual process where political 
power is handed over. Lastly is the consolidation of the democratic regime, which allows 
for investigations to occur (Heine, 2007, p.68). Many TCs are a response to the suffering 
of past abuses (Lutz, 2006). As Heine (2007) clarifies, political and social changes must 
occur, but Naomi Roht-Arriaza (2006) points out that transition takes decades, and 
violations may not be immediately addressed. 
 
An ideal TC has a clear mandate defining the powers of the commission and topics under 
investigation (Albon, 1993). It is also important to have the support of civil society and 
the commission leadership appropriate to the social and political context under 
investigation (Albon, 1993). Having sufficient resources is equally essential, as is 
transparency, and maintenance of due process (Albon, 1993). However, these goals are 
rarely politically uncomplicated in implementation. 
 
b) Context of Truth Commissions  
TCs are usually established during political or post-conflict transition, but their exact 
timing varies. A legacy of widespread violence and oppression precede most TCs 
(Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2011). The intensity of the conflict and abuses, the status of 
political institutions and the societal desire to actually acknowledge the past all influence 
if, when and how a TC comes into existence (Hughes, Schabas and Thakur, 2007, p.1). 
Remedies for these violations under international law are the responsibility of the state 
(Zalaquett, 1989). TCs are inherently political enterprises with various motives; having a 
TC is less expensive than paying compensation to victims, and are perceived as less 
threatening than trials, thereby protecting politicians and leaders who want to avoid 
prosecution (Freeman, 2006). All these aspects are taken into consideration before 
attempting to create a TC. 
 
The establishment of a TC can affect political, military, ethnic and religious power 
structures (Zalaquett, 1989). With a clear military or political victory, policy decisions 
are unlikely to endanger positions of power, but if the defeated forces are still in power, it 
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is unlikely human rights abuses will be addressed (Zalaquett, 1989). Whether a TC exists 
and accomplishes its mandate is contingent on the availability of civil society and the 
economic context (Albon, 1992). Generally, many of the economic causes of violations, 
such as land reform and redistribution, are not addressed (Mani, 2007). Even after 
significant time has passed since the violations, political and economic perspectives 
dominate. 
 
TCs are victim-centered and contend with victims’ emotional and psychological stress 
(Hayner, 2011, p.2). Victims and survivors tend to suffer increased rates of general 
nervousness, sleeplessness, anxiety, paranoia, depression and grief and due to the nature 
of many violations, victims are distrustful of government institutions- all of which can 
hamper reconciliation (Kritz, 1995, p.9; Albon, 1992). Some advocate for “social 
forgetting”- leaving the past alone (Freeman, 2006, p.39). Yet, others argue “after the 
collective trauma of repressive dictatorships, nations need a moment of ‘rebirth’ or 
‘regeneration’ of their sense of identity and being” (Heine, 2007, p.72). However it is 
important that victims’ rights are addressed: “[V]ictims are also victims of violations of 
social, economic and cultural rights because of secular social marginalization, historical 
neglect, or” lack of services and infrastructure (ICTJ, 2009, p.47). TCs that focus on 
victims advance societal healing. 
 
Many TCs also have to address the involvement of international actors in human rights 
violations and how much they should be involved in the TC process (Gloppen, 2005). 
Whether contributing to monetary reparations or supporting the TC, involvement of the 
international community can influence the perceived legitimacy of a commission 
(Hayner, 2011, p.17).  Timing can affect the legitimacy of a TC as well. If a TC is 
created, then disbands, or is unable to carry out its mandate, it becomes more difficult to 
create another later (Hayner, 2011). If there is a negative experience, politicians and civil 
society alike are less likely to want another. Sometimes, waiting gives the government 
time to plan and strengthen institutions in order to create and maintain an effective TC 
(Hayner, 2011). Timing and international participation influence a TC’s future success. 
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TCs have other goals besides promoting and advancing human rights, yet evaluation of 
them is an integral part in recognizing the overall pattern of abuses. There is widespread 
agreement “that truth commissions can and should advance human rights” (Olsen, et al., 
2010, p.459). This is important because “‘[w]ithout guarantees of civil and political 
rights’, ‘citizen’ has little meaning” (Wilcox, 2009, p.51). Rights to justice, truth, 
reparation and guarantee of non-repetition are obligations of the state. Recent 
commissions have begun to address economic, social and cultural rights to broaden the 
understanding of abuses and their prevention (Hayner, 2011, p.77). Having a TC can also 
deter future violations, advance protection measures and legitimize human rights culture 
(Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). 
 
c) Components of Truth Commissions 
The main components of a TC consist of a mandate, leadership, funding, civil society 
participation, activities and final recommendations. A mandate is created through a 
presidential decree, which is implemented more swiftly, or by the legislature, which can 
create stronger powers (Hayner, 2011, p.210). A mandate determines the scope and 
powers of the TC, the subject matter, and defines the truth that is to be documented. It 
also establishes a timeline with a clear end that allows for thorough investigations and 
capitalizes on public support (Hayner, 2011, p.215). Public support is also contingent on 
the transparency of the process and the autonomy of the TC (Freeman, 2006, p.17; Baehr, 
2007). The leadership of a TC is comprised of commissioners whose efforts can either 
strengthen or hinder a TCs ability to work. Time constraints, limited resources and staff, 
using unreliable information, and dealing with political pressure are all issues 
commissioners have to contend with (Hayner, 2011). Funding is also important to enable 
TCs to carry out their mandate effectively. It is important that a significant amount of the 
funding is provided by the violating state so they are seen to be addressing the wrongs 
they committed. Civil society can generate pressure for the creation of a TC, and work to 
hold it accountable. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) also provide important 
information, local knowledge and contacts, and even detailed files to support a TC’s 
work. These components are essential to the functioning of a TC. 
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The activities of a commission are important to truth gathering efforts, legitimacy and 
legacy. How a commission collects, organizes and evaluates information is important 
since it influences conclusions made. Whether to hold public hearings or private 
interviews can influence society’s view of the TC. Public hearings encourage greater 
understanding of the violations and reduce the likelihood of truth denial (Hayner, 2011). 
On the other hand, private hearings and meetings may be necessary for security and 
preventing unchecked accusations from being made public (Hayner, 2011). If 
perpetrators are still in power, TCs will generally not be allowed to identify perpetrators 
and even if they do, issues of due process often arise. At the very least, a commission can 
provide names to the president for future prosecutions. Other truth finding activities such 
as exhumations and historical research also contribute to the legacy of a TC. 
 
The work of a TC culminates with a final report and recommendations for addressing the 
violations and ensuring non-repetition. Some recommendations focus on changing laws 
and institutions. In this aspect, there has been a weak record of implementation for most 
TCs (Hayner, 2011). Other recommendations often include domestic trials, public 
apology or memorials, reburial, reparations, literary and historical writings and 
addressing general or individual impunity (Crocker, 2000, p.100). Holding other 
stakeholders accountable is essential, especially the judiciary and the police (Baehr, 
2007). The most difficult part of ensuring a TC’s success is implementing the 
recommendations to ensure improvement in the promotion of human rights. 
 
d) Truth Commission Goals 
TCs work to investigate past abuses in order to rectify them and recommend changes to 
address their legacy. A main goal of TCs is to ensure non-repetition and improve societal 
relationships for the future (Zalaquett, 1989; Hayner, 2011). Additionally, TCs aim to 
rebuild trust between citizens and the government, and among citizens. Discovering the 
truth is another motivator, though seemingly secondary to the factors above. Michael 
Ignatieff (1996) notes, “the past is an argument and the function of truth commissions…is 
simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies” (Hayner, 2011, 
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p.21). TCs are capable of reaching more people than other transitional measures
1
 and 
resolve institutional shortcomings that led to abuses. In order to achieve a TC’s goal, 
disseminating the truth and providing guidelines to reconciliation are essential. 
 
TCs are complex institutions that address the various political and social barriers to 
reaching reconciliation. A society composed of perpetrators, victims and bystanders 
means TCs have to be as transparent and as unbiased as possible to avoid reigniting 
tensions (Minow, 1998). A TC is also a political enterprise that contends with combating 
impunity and upholding the truth. A goal for many states is to clearly differentiate 
themselves from the previous government’s wrongdoings. TCs also focus on various 
human rights violations. Violations to the right to life, torture, trials and legal recognition 
are many of the rights violated during oppressive regimes or during conflict. More 
recently, violations of economic, social, and cultural rights have gained attention. Worker 
rights, social security, health, education, and culture are just some of the rights that have 
not only been violated by governments, but are consistently used as ways to remedy the 
original harm. Addressing all human rights can only strengthen the results of TCs’ work. 
 
e) Traditional Route 
Earlier TCs influenced the development of transitional measures by creating general 
standards. The more traditional TCs were created immediately after cessation of armed 
conflict or pacted transitions from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic one. 
They occurred primarily in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe; Argentina, South 
Africa and Chile had TCs that are regularly analyzed and studied. These earlier 
commissions focused on what happened during the relatively recent regime or conflict.  
 
Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons formed immediately 
after a pacted transition in 1983, covered enforced disappearance and located remains 
from authoritarian military rule (1973-1982). The nature of the transition and the 
continued power of the military limited the commission’s capacity to work. Thus, truth-
finding efforts had to contend with political realities of strong opposition and a limited 
                                                        
1
 Other measures include trials, amnesties, reparations, and institutional reforms. 
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mandate. Civil society, however, was a strong ally, providing statements and records, and 
pressuring the government for support. The result of the investigations was a report and 
general recommendations of economic assistance, study grants, social security and 
employment (Hayner, 2011, p.274). The commission’s findings and archives enabled 
later prosecutions (Hayner, 2011, p.280).  
 
Chile’s truth and reconciliation efforts spanned two commissions that were able to make 
significant changes. The initial TC (1990-1991) occurred after a peaceful democratic 
transition from the authoritarian rule of Augusto Pinochet. Like Argentina, this earlier TC 
had to contend with strong opposition to their mandate and amnesty laws that encouraged 
impunity. The second commission (2003-2005) was able to utilize more favorable 
political conditions to further investigations- unlike the first. In total, the commissions 
looked at disappearances, related violations and violations to the right to life. Chile’s 
recommendations and reparations were extensive, covering pensions, education, health 
and housing benefits and monetary compensation (Hayner, 2011, p.275).  
 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (1995-2002), addressed over 
forty years of apartheid. Gross violations of human rights ranged from killing and 
abduction to torture. The effects of everyday policies and practices of apartheid were not 
included (Hayner, 2011, p.268). The South African TRC was robust, with significant 
powers bestowed by parliament, including the ability to grant amnesty. Reparations 
included monetary compensation, medical assistance, education and other benefits, which 
were gradually implemented (Hayner, 2011, p.274). Though prosecutions were also 
recommended none occurred.  
 
“Traditional” TCs like those in Argentina, Chile and South Africa laid the foundation for 
future commissions. Although TCs are unique to their country and the conditions they 
work in, there are lessons to be learned from past attempts. Chile and Argentina 
especially demonstrate the importance of a favorable political climate and time to the 
carrying out of justice. Reconciliation does not happen immediately and, if at all possible, 
requires time and positive circumstances. It is unlikely that an entire society can 
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reconcile, but between the state and the people, reconciliation looks to be probable in 
these nations, given the relative calm and development of democratic mechanisms.  
 
Traditional commissions also provide examples of truth mechanisms. Verification 
procedures, treatment of victims, use of records, the role of history, and influence of 
politics all developed in the 1990s. These earlier commissions, based on prior 
investigative bodies, developed organizational models of staff, operating periods, 
investigative powers and mandates. They set the standard for later commissions who 
could study the effects of limited powers in certain situations, which activities worked 
and which were not so successful.  
 
Despite making great strides, these earlier commissions neglected the experiences and 
involvement of children and gender considerations, and the effects of economic, social 
and cultural violations on society. The focus of transitional justice, and therefore TCs, is 
usually on civil and political rights. By neglecting gender and children, these early TCs 
were unable to gain a full understanding of the variation and complexity of the violations 
(Hayner, 2011). Along with thematic limitations of earlier commissions, implementation 
of recommendations remains an issue today.  
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III. Debates 
The rise of transitional justice measures, including TCs, has led to theorizing about the 
best ways to deal with human rights violations. TCs have to balance memory, forgetting, 
vengeance and forgiveness (Minow, 1998, p.4). Finding that balance is difficult, and 
inevitably the responses are imperfect, but provide a way to address significant issues in 
society and human rights violations. 
 
a) Healing 
A goal of most TCs is the healing of victims and the nation. Healing is heavily influenced 
by Christian theology, focusing on confession, forgiveness and catharsis (Skaar, Gloppen, 
and Suhrke, 2005, p.6). In most TCs, healing is a therapeutic goal for victims. Some 
scholars object to the simplicity of the premise that testifying and learning facts leads to 
healing (Hayner, 2011, p.153). In many cases testifying once can help, but can also cause 
relapses of post-traumatic stress disorder (Minow, 1998). The notion that TCs lead to 
healing may be overstated, as it is not proven that TCs alone cause individual or societal 
remedies (Hayner, 2011). There is consensus that TCs alone cannot provide individual 
and societal healing, but when efforts are long-term there may be positive effects. 
 
Proponents instead emphasize the importance of beginning the healing process because 
unaddressed social and individual wounds may fester and cause future problems (Hayner, 
2011, p.145). TCs can also begin to satisfy the victims’ need to tell their stories (Hayner, 
2011, p.147). Acknowledgement provides the chance to grieve and begin the healing 
process (Hayner, 2011, p.147). According to Martha Minow, TC workers can provide 
acknowledgement and validation, and recognize the indignity of the abuses (1998, p.72). 
A TC can help “by identifying someone’s suffering as an indictment of the social context 
rather than treating it as a private experience that should be forgotten” (Minow, 1998, 
p.72). Placing the individual harm in its larger context allows the victim to recognize they 
are not alone, contributing to their psychological healing. Other sources of support in 
many societies include community organizations, traditional healers, religious institutions 
and extended family and friends (Hayner, 2011, p.157). Utilizing different healing 
mechanisms can significantly assist TC reconciliation efforts. 
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By not addressing psychological and physical abuses, society can become scarred. 
According to Jamal Benomar, it is necessary for societies “to face the truth about their 
recent history, but there should then be a process of healing that draws a line between” 
the past and the future (1993, p.33). This perspective implies that the new government is 
capable of initiating new policies and practices after human rights abuses have ended. 
Thus, the effects of human rights abuses and intergenerational transmission should be 
considered in a TC (ICTJ, 2009). Addressing historical violations encourages a society to 
improve the future. 
 
Another part of the healing process is forgiveness. As Minow writes, “through 
forgiveness, we can renounce resentment, and avoid self-destructive effects of holding on 
to pain, grudges, and victimhood” (1998, p.14). The act of forgiving indicates a “change 
in how the offended feels about the person who committed the injury” (Minow, 1998, 
p.17). Initiating public forgiveness can, however, have the adverse effect of signalling the 
need to forget-the opposite of most TCs’ goals (Minow, 1998, p.17). Ultimately, 
forgiveness is an individual power victims possess that cannot be forced. 
 
b) Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is one of many goals of TCs, yet there is no clear path to reach 
reconciliation since changes to the political culture take significant time and it is 
something that cannot be forced upon citizens (Crocker, 2000; Mani, 2007, p.35). 
Reconciliation may never be fully achieved, but should remain a goal (ICTJ, 2008). 
According to David Crocker (2005), reconciliation at its simplest is coexistence, 
democratic reciprocity and reconstruction of social bonds between victims and 
perpetrators (2005, p.108). Pablo de Greiff considers reconciliation to minimally be “the 
condition under which citizens can trust one another as citizens again (or anew)” (2008, 
p.126). Minow also notes that there is individual and national reconciliation (2007). 
Through empirical research, Priscilla Hayner advances the point that the process is 
context-specific (Hayner, 2011, p.189). There are many views of what constitutes 
reconciliation. Crocker identifies three degrees of reconciliation with the aim of 
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reconciling adversaries and reintegrating them into society: the “thinner” is simply 
coexistence; the “thin” is reconciliation between individuals; the “thick” reconciliation 
calls for a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing and restoration and mutual 
forgiveness (Crocker, 2005, p.108; Skaar, Gloppen, and Suhrke, 2005, p.4). Rama Mani 
suggests the need to clarify what reconciliation actually is and if current efforts can 
achieve it (2009, p.29).
2
 Reconciliation is also not always the primary purpose of creating 
a TC, yet it contributes to restricting future violations (Hayner, 2011, p.23; Minow, 
1998). It can also create unrealistic expectations for a TCs ability to address violations 
(Mani, 2007). Elin Skaar, et al., emphasize that it is an on-going process that may not 
have an end point (2005, p.10 and p.14). Reconciliation is a societal process, although 
imperfect, that is important for addressing past human rights violations. 
 
 
Reconciliation at the individual level is difficult. Everyone has different experiences and 
different ways of handling stress and abuse. Siri Gloppen defines individual 
reconciliation as “how people come to terms with each other at the interpersonal level 
after traumatic events and with their own past experience” (2005, p.20). Minow (1998) 
suggests redistribution, public acknowledgment, financial redress, psychological or 
spiritual healing in order to reconcile with others and with society. An issue for some TCs 
is by not identifying those responsible, victims lacked a focus for their reconciliation, 
causing ambiguity (Hayner, 2011). 
 
Reconciliation at the societal level can result from criminal justice, truth telling, 
reparations, apologies and institutional reform (De Greiff, 2008). For John Paul Lederach 
(1998), reconciliation is a social space in which human rights violations can be addressed 
to deal with the past pain through truth, forgiveness and justice to build a common future. 
“Societies have to struggle over how much to acknowledge, whether to punish and how 
to recover” (Minow, 1998, p.2). The local, regional and national levels all have 
mechanisms that can be utilized for reconciling (Gloppen, 2005, p.20). Reconciliation in 
the political realm hinges on mutual respect as citizens with equal rights (Gloppen, 2005). 
                                                        
2
 see also Hayner, 2011, p.182; de Greiff, 2008, p.120 
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According to Gloppen, the processes for reconciling at the national level are reinforced at 
the individual and community levels (2005, p.22). For Peter Baehr, true reconciliation 
requires a focus on social justice and a concern with socio-economic conditions, rather 
than truth, to break the cycle of impunity (2007, p.19).  
 
There are certain conditions conducive for reconciliation. Hayner suggests that these are: 
an end to violence, or the threat of violence, acknowledgement and reparations, 
addressing structural inequalities and material needs, and time (2011, p.190). Individual 
civility toward others as civic equals is important in order to work towards reconciliation 
(Gutman and Thompson, 2000, p.35). Trust is important, and occurs when people expect 
a certain pattern of behavior and similar moral codes (De Greiff, 2008, p.126). At the 
societal level, “trusting an institution…amounts to knowing that its constitutive rules, 
values, and norms are shared by participants and that they regard them as binding” (De 
Greiff, 2008, p.126). Additionally, establishing an official truth allows competing parties 
to debate without past issues threatening to exacerbate tensions (Hayner, 2011, p.183; De 
Greiff, 2008, p.131).  
 
Besides truth and trust, reconciliation also relies on mechanisms to address the past 
(Skaar, Gloppen and Suhkre, 2005, p.10). Affirming and restoring dignity of those whose 
human rights have been violated, holding perpetrators accountable and creating 
conditions in which human rights will be respected create a culture conducive to the 
success of reconciliation (Kiss, 2000, p.79). There are different transitional strategies 
capable of encouraging reconciliation. These include “the public and private rituals and 
narratives that sustain collective and individual memories of the history, causes and 
course of mass crime, and allow the re-interpretation and re-assertion of the belief 
systems” (Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel, 2007, p.12). Other ways to address 
reconciliation include establishing a clear rule of law and justice mechanisms, 
administrative purging, local ownership of processes, instituting reforms, discovering 
forensic facts and the reasons behind events (Skaar, Gloppen and Suhkre, 2005). It is 
important that the link between the service, benefit or reparative measure is obvious to 
the recipients (ICTJ, 2009). The state must acknowledge its role in failing to prevent 
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abuses or protect their populations (Gloppen, 2005). So that citizens can see how human 
rights are being addressed, the government must communicate effectively with them. 
 
c. Reparations 
Reparations are a restorative justice measure that contributes to reconciliation. Reparation 
programs, unlike government policy and justice measures can be “the most focused on 
the rights and welfare of victims and survivors” (ICTJ, 2009). Reparations represent the 
intent of the state to improve their relationship with their citizens (De Greiff, 2008). 
Measures aid the victims in managing the material aspect of their loss, constitute an 
official acknowledgment, and deter the state from future abuses due to the financial cost 
(Kritz, 1995).  
 
Reparations can be individual, collective, tangible or symbolic measures that include 
assisting with health issues, restoring property, jobs, building memorials and museums or 
providing the truth (Zalaquett, 1989; Minow, 1998; ICTJ, 2009). However, “in reality all 
reparations measures are symbolic because reparations can never really reverse the 
crimes committed” (ICTJ, 2009, p.49). According to Luc Huyse, monetary compensation 
for past abuses is the most concrete form of reparation (1995, p.338). Monetary 
reparations give agency and can be used for self-determined needs rather than services 
that may not be needed (Hayner, 2011, p.180). Yet, some demands may be directed 
toward securing the basic elements of survival such as housing, food, healthcare and 
means of a livelihood (ICTJ, 2009, p.9). Other strategies are rehabilitation of public 
records, education, acknowledgment through trials, apologies or TCs and peace building 
efforts (Gloppen, 2005, p.38). These are generally administered by the state, per their 
obligation (Hayner, 2011, p.165). In order for the measures to be effective, they need to 
be specific to the national realities (Hayner, 2011, p.179). Eric Yamamoto (1997) in 
Minow (1998) provides some guidelines for reparations that include not assuming how 
the reparations will work, considering whether or not reparations will promote 
reconciliation or worsen social divisions and whether they improve conditions of 
survivors. 
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Collective reparations provide services and compensation to not just individuals but to a 
community or group. Many individual victims are bound by common experiences or 
identity (ICTJ, 2009, p.10). If rights violations have been systematic and widespread, 
public trust is destroyed and community wide measures are sometimes necessary to 
rebuild that trust. One view is that collective reparations avoid the potentially disruptive 
effect individual reparations can have by perceived favor of certain people over others 
(ICTJ, 2009, p.10). Others view collective reparations as easily confused with 
humanitarian aid or development projects that governments are obligated to carry out 
(ICTJ, 2009, p.11). It is also important that governments clarify the meaning behind 
projects so victims are aware of it as a response to violations, not a development project. 
There are harms that have a collective impact by affecting the capacity of the community 
to maintain communal property, practices or services (ICTJ, 2009, p.44). Collective 
reparations may also give certain groups advantages over other disadvantaged groups 
(ICTJ, 2009, p.45). Collective reparations are not easy to implement and may cause 
resistance because they do not address the personal nature of the human rights violations 
(ICTJ, 2009, p.11). Collective reparations cannot substitute for individual measures, but 
can be effective when combined with other measures and addressing widespread 
violations. 
 
The basic questions of who receives reparations and what types they receive have 
important implications. Victim participation in the process gives agency and greater 
acceptance. Survivors are not just victims of human rights abuses, but of historic 
economic and social injustice (ICTJ, 2009, p.45). In some developing countries, human 
rights violations are practiced on the economically and socially vulnerable, and 
addressing their social and economic needs in general overlap with reparative measures 
(ICTJ, 2009, p.9).  
 
Minow points out that monetary reparations may not be enough to deal with non-
monetary issues or be effective at all. It is impossible to distinguish between levels of 
suffering (Hayner, 2011, p.180). Reparations are more effective if the measures are 
carried out voluntarily (Gloppen, 2005). However, not all states have the economic 
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capacity to compensate victims at the necessary levels. In most cases, government 
responses to recommendations can be slow and incomplete (Hayner, 2011, p.163). 
Decisions to carry out recommendations tend to be done in the state’s best interest, and 
there is no guarantee of any positive impact (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p.147).  
 
d) Apology 
Another tool for bringing about reconciliation is apology. Official apologies can correct 
the public and historical record and assign responsibility. An apology cannot undo the 
violations that occurred, but it helps to have the government acknowledge the violations. 
It can provide some historical consensus regarding violations that occurred in the past 
(James, 2008, p.138). 
 
An apology is an act of respect. It “is an action performed by an appropriate person 
saying appropriate words on an appropriate occasion” (Thompson, 2008, p.32). An 
apology is an important dispute resolution mechanism in hierarchical societies because 
disputes are seen as challenges to positions in the hierarchy (Renteln, 2008, p.65). An 
apology “can be defined as a written or spoken expression of regret, sorrow and remorse 
for having wronged, insulted, failed and/or injured another” (Coicaud and Jonsson, 2008, 
p.78). An official political apology “is given by a representative of a state, corporation, or 
other organized group to victims or descendants of victims, for injustices committed by 
the group’s officials or members” (Thompson, 2008, p.31). Matt James outlines the 
requirements for a legitimate apology: clearly naming the wrong, taking responsibility, 
expressing regret, promoting non-repetition, refraining from demanding forgiveness, 
being recorded officially in writing, not hypothetical or arbitrary and engages the 
wronged community through ceremony, publicity and reparation (2008, p.138; 
Thompson, 2008). It is far more than a verbal action, but has multiple aspects that 
influence its effectiveness. 
 
By apologizing, power and agency is given to the victims to decide when and if to 
forgive. It reverses “the logic of the offense, creating a space in which reconciliation 
might begin” (James, 2008, p.137). According to Siri Gloppen, “public apologies- even 
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without full disclosure- are more likely to lead to reconciliation than truth without 
contrition” (2005, p.36). Apologies also open up dialogue and begin the process of 
discovering the truth (Coicaud and Jonsson, 2008, p.80). In many respects it is the first 
step toward addressing past violations. 
 
Despite the power of apology, it is still a political tool.  States only apologize when it is 
within their interests to do so (Freeman, 2008). James (2008) points out how observers 
overestimate the effect these apologies have on human rights abuses. In the past though, 
the government “has gotten unseemly political advantage from apologies” (James, 2008, 
p.137). Ways of apologizing can vary across cultures, with variations within the same 
society (Renteln, 2008, p.64; Howard-Hassman and Gibney, 2008). It can also be a tool 
to repair a damaged reputation, which puts into question the sincerity of the act (Renteln, 
2008). The sincerity of the apology can be a contentious issue. 
 
e. Justice 
Justice is an integral component of transitional measures and accountability for human 
rights violations. There is debate about what justice measures are appropriate. The role of 
justice in TCs concerns accountability measures and providing the basis for future justice 
measures to be taken. There are differing opinions on how justice measures contribute to 
reconciliation. Justice is defined as the “[e]xercise of authority or power in maintenance 
of right; vindication of right by assignment of reward or punishment” (OED, 2011a). 
Aims include creating a new legal order and ending impunity, establishing the truth and 
accountability, acknowledging wrongs, recognizing the rights of the victims and 
providing compensation (Gloppen, 2005). In the case of addressing human rights abuses, 
restorative or reparative justice is a focus, providing some agency for victims to try to 
reconcile with the past (OED, 2011b). Some have defined restorative justice as restoring 
victims to the situation they were in before the injustices took place or receive 
compensation equal to that level (Thompson, 2008, p.33). Methods include existing 
transitional justice measures, commemoration, healing, education, apologies, 
acknowledgment and restitution (Mani, 2007, p.39). 
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For some, justice as a goal or mechanism is not the answer to resolving human rights 
abuses. Pursuing justice for past crimes can be politically dangerous or impossible, 
limiting any future chances of reconciliation or truth collection. Some crimes have a 
statute of limitations; attempting to seek accountability may not be possible. Neil Kritz 
(1995) points out that there is also the legal principle of ex post facto, which makes 
prosecution difficult if the violation was legal when it occurred.
3
 Freeman (2006) 
elaborates by noting that amnesty laws and international norms not part of domestic laws 
guarantee incomplete justice. Besides legal limitations, the trials themselves are not 
effective. Hayner suggests that judicial limitations are due to a weak judiciary, judges 
being politically compromised, corrupt or timid, a lack of legal expertise in the country 
and limited resources (2011, p.9). Using a legal remedy in some situations is not 
effective. 
 
Trials and justice measures are not inclusive and, for many, limit reconciliation 
processes. Mani (2007) emphasizes that trials exclude bystanders, beneficiaries and large 
parts of the population that were structurally and indirectly affected by the violations. In 
many situations, as Minow (1998) mentions, legal responses are not enough to address 
the violations due to their scale. By focusing on individual responsibility, trials omit 
perpetrators who directly or indirectly profited from the abuses, “states outside the area of 
conflict that may have contributed to” the human rights violations, and “bystanders who 
did not actively participate in violence, but who also did not actively intervene to stop the 
horrors” (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, p.579). Focusing on individual accountability 
rather than the participation of society may contribute to the creation of a view of 
collective innocence (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, p.580). Minow (1998) points out 
that, by taking legal action, it becomes unlikely that the complete narrative will be 
known. 
 
Trials may also further divide society, create martyrs or fuel collective victimization 
(Gloppen, 2005). According to Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010), trials do not promote 
forward-looking policies, create an adversarial environment and may be inadequate to 
                                                        
3
 also Zalaquett,1989; Huyse, 1995, p.344 
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address extensive crimes or crimes that occurred in the far past. Evidence and witnesses 
can also be hard to find. Some shortfalls of trials include potential relapse into 
committing human rights violations, further victimizing survivors through cross-
examination, having little evidence due to destruction, general weakness of the judiciary, 
inability to provide witness protection, corruption of officials and the need for a 
functioning penal system (Mani, 2007, p.31). It is an imperfect mechanism for addressing 
widespread human rights violations. 
 
Despite the myriad of critiques and limitations of justice, there are instances where it is 
important to pursue justice and accountability measures. For Minow, “society cannot 
forgive what it cannot punish” (1998, p.58). Accountability measures can result in 
victims feeling empowered and able to reintegrate into society (Mani, 2007). Trials and 
other justice measures can also act as a deterrent to future human rights violations 
(Huyse, 1995).
4
 Ending impunity by holding perpetrators accountable can contribute to 
individual reconciliation (Gloppen, 2005). Trials become a symbol of democratic 
consolidation, and contribute to the perception that the new regime is legitimate (Huyse, 
1995). To not punish human rights violations means the crimes are condoned, enabling 
them to be repeated (Benomar, 1993, p.32). However, in some situations “the guilty ones 
are often persons who are also needed for the rebuilding of society,” so justice and 
accountability are not straightforward for long-term development (Baehr, 2007, p.9). 
Overall, accountability measures are important for legal and social development after 
human rights violations. 
 
In all efforts to address human rights abuses amnesty policies must be handled and the 
importance of due process recognized (Baehr, 1993; Gutman and Thompson, 2000). It 
“requires the individuals accused of crimes to be allowed to defend themselves before 
being pronounced guilty” (Hayner, 2011, p.121). Hayner suggests that if perpetrators are 
to be named they be given a chance to offer a defense (2011, p.141). Amnesty is a 
controversial mechanism in seeking truth and justice. For Minow, it “institutionalizes 
forgetfulness, and sacrifices justice in a foreshortened effort to move on” (1998, p.15). In 
                                                        
4
 See also Benomar, 1993, p.33 
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some cases, amnesty laws were passed by outgoing elites to protect themselves from 
future prosecution, yet this has not proven to be foolproof; it is also an international norm 
that there can be no amnesty for the major international crimes of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide (Hayner, 2011). TCs must consider amnesty 
provisions and due process requirements. 
 
Improvements to the legal system can restore faith and trust in the government. It is 
important to “overturn impunity, to hold all actors including political leaders equal before 
the law, to hold the state to account, and to develop the capacity within an independent 
judiciary” for fair trials over time (Mani, 2007, p.28). If the political culture is hostile to 
traditional justice measures or reconciliation processes, justice reforms create space for 
tackling accountability issues later when the justice infrastructure is more capable (Mani, 
2007). Despite its limitations, justice measures are still influential in reconciliation. 
 
f) Truth 
According to Crocker, “To meet the challenges of transitional justice, a society should 
investigate, establish, and publicly disseminate the truth about past atrocities” (2000, 
p.100). Many scholars assume that disseminating the truth to society contributes to 
reconciliation (See Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, p.587; Gloppen, 2005, p.33). By 
keeping the truth hidden, institutions maintain a myth and absorb negative traits and 
practices from the previous regime that perpetuate the violations (Zalaquett, 1989, p.7). 
Thus, for the truth about human rights violations to be effective in promoting 
reconciliation, the truth must instead be as complete as possible (Zalaquett, 1989). 
 
In international law, the UN has recognized the right to truth, and the state’s obligation to 
provide it. In 2005 and 2006, after investigating if the right to truth had firm basis in law, 
the UN found:  
“The right to the truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations 
of human rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right, linked to the duty and 
obligation of the state to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct effective 
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investigations and to guarantee effective remedy and reparations” (UNHCHR, 
2006, p.2) 
The investigation based this right on international humanitarian law that included the 
right of families to know the fate of relatives and the obligation of armed parties to search 
for missing persons (UNHCHR, 2006). It also included the right to know the truth in 
combating impunity, for internally displaced persons to know relatives’ fates, to know the 
truth in order to provide remedies and reparations, right to access the investigations’ 
results, and to prompt an effective judicial remedy (UNHCHR, 2006, p.6). The UN 
identified the right to truth, “in connection with the State’s duty to conduct effective 
investigations into serious violations of human rights and the right to an effective judicial 
remedy” (UNHCHR, 2006, p.8). An international norm developed through legal cases 
and the use of TCs, obligating the state to uncover the truth regarding human rights 
violations and use proof to counter impunity. 
 
Truth is defined as, “conformity with fact; agreement with reality; accuracy, correctness, 
verity” (OED, 2011c). For TC activities, one main type of truth investigated is “forensic” 
truth, or “hard” truths, focusing on facts such as who was violated, by whom, when, 
where, and why (Crocker, 2000). Exhumations, physical evidence and interviews 
contribute to such investigations. Even this type of truth can be manipulated; information 
can be withheld or unavailable due to time passed or witnesses being uncooperative. 
Another type of truth is “emotional” truths - the psychological and physical impacts on 
victims and survivors (Crocker, 2000). The actions of the state and their opponents are 
more “general” truths (Crocker, 2000). Producing a report for wide distribution is a 
corrective and preventative action to address truth and historical injustices (Minow, 1998; 
Freeman, 2006). However, for the victim, the “community reasserts the truth of the 
victim’s value by inflicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer” (Minow, 1998, 
p.12). Truth seeking is the central aspect of TC work. 
 
Truth seeking assumes there is a singular truth, which is not always the case (Rhot-
Arriaza, 2006; Crocker, 2000). Scholar Erin Daly (2008), as cited in Hayner (2011), 
expressed how it is “unrealistic to expect one accepted truth to emerge from a TC process 
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in some contexts” (p.25). The process can also frustrate and re-traumatize victims and 
have no effect on the local power dynamics (Roht-Arriaza, 2006). In some cases, TCs do 
not find new truths, but rather break the silence (Hayner, 2011, p.20). One part of truth 
gathering is interviewing the victims and perpetrators. However, due to time lapse and 
trauma there could be significant discrepancies. Minow (1998) rightly points out that 
something will always be missing or left out. Truth seeking is also limited because most 
TCs are only able to investigate a small number of cases, have limited subpoena or cross-
examination powers and are usually unable to do in-depth historical analysis of the 
causes and effects of violations (Crocker, 2000). Other barriers include restricted access 
to evidence and not enacting recommendations (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). Truth can 
also be dangerous by stirring up animosity and resentment. Mani suggests that it is 
debatable whether or not truth is central to reconciliation given the potential for multiple 
truths (2007, p.34). Official truths can be incomplete or too narrow. 
 
Despite the dangers and concerns of truth seeking efforts, it is often worth the risk. For de 
Greiff, truth telling can foster trust through an institutionalized effort to confront the past, 
perceived as taking responsibility (2008, p.133). It can also provide some personal 
healing. As Minow writes, “the potential restorative power of truth-telling, the 
significance of sympathetic witnesses, and the constructive roles of perpetrators and 
bystanders” contribute toward reconciliation (1998, p.65). Truth can also restore and 
affirm the human and civil dignity of the victims (Kiss, 2000, p.71). Discerning the truth 
can provide an understanding of overall patterns, institutional context and the extent of 
abuses, and the general causes and consequences of violations (Crocker, 2000, p.101).  
 
g) Truth vs. Justice 
For many there is a debate of whether to focus on discovering the truth, or pursuing 
justice. Some view it as a trade off between the two: if truth finding is carried out, justice 
is sacrificed; justice measures are taken at the expense of truth. In some situations, truth 
seeking is the better choice due to judicial systems’ role in tolerating, allowing and 
perpetuating abuses (Hayner, 2011, p.105). Justice measures are also limited by focusing 
on individual culpability over system-wide analysis. A TC is “more likely than trials to 
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yield accounts of entire regimes” (Minow, 1998, p.60). There are different standards of 
proof. Justice focuses on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas TCs focus on 
whether there is more evidence to show something to be true than not true (Hayner, 2011, 
p.142). For either choice- truth or justice- due process is essential (Crocker, 2000). There 
are situations in which prosecution is not always possible, and TCs are able to “reach a 
broader group of perpetrators and victims” than lengthy trials (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, 
p.14). Using TCs can also weaken rule of law because not having legal procedures avoids 
the creation of legal precedents (Rentlen, 2008, p.70). If justice is not pursued in 
exchange for truth initially, such actions need to be justified and other justice measures 
must be taken (Gutman and Thompson, 2000, p. 23).  
 
By now, a fear of “a ‘trade-off’ between truth and justice has largely receded” (Hayner, 
2011, p.92). Experience has shown that having a TC has not damaged or weakened 
criminal justice efforts (Hayner, 2011; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p.24). Hayner further 
notes, “[m]ost truth commissions do not interfere with or duplicate any tasks of the 
judiciary” (Hayner, 2011, p.13). Crocker (2000) and Elizabeth Kiss (2000) both support 
the view that TCs are compatible with trials and that findings can be utilized for 
prosecutions. For Crocker, “both truth commissions and trials have distinctive and 
mutually supplementary roles in achieving the multiple goals of transitional justice” 
(2000, p.105). Kiss notes that truth ultimately is necessary to “distinguish the innocent 
from the guilty” and to break “the cycles of violence and oppression that characterize 
profoundly unjust societies” (2000, p.71). TCs are able to incorporate justice measures 
making them more effective at establishing the truth. 
 
TCs have advantages and limitations compared to justice measures. TCs are able to 
develop a broader view of accountability, while prosecutions “are slow, partial, and 
narrow” (Minow, 1998, p.9). For Michael Ignatieff (1997), “public access to a 
commission’s hearings and reports ‘narrows the range of permissible lies’” (Olsen, et al., 
2010, p.460). However, “[i]t is impossible for any short-term commission to fully detail 
the extent and effect of widespread abuses that took place over many years” (Hayner, 
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2011). TCs can signal that violence is unnecessary to react to past crimes and there are 
more peaceful and less threatening ways to address human rights violations.  
 
Freeman (2006) suggests that TCs may not be the best choice if they are biased, have 
insufficient resources or lack the proper political motivation. Regardless, “elite control 
and manipulation are widespread” and there is a failure “to address the systems of 
domination that produced the violations in the first place” (James, 2012, p.182). TCs 
have a varied track record when it comes to prompting further development in human 
rights though and can lead to more violations (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). As for 
recommendations, “governments are more likely to enact TC recommendations when 
politicians can be held accountable for failing to so” (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p.147). 
When TCs are domestic, there tends to be a higher success rate, which directly influences 
justice mechanisms (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). 
 
Studies have found that TCs used alone can have a negative impact on human rights, but 
when combined with trials and amnesties, have a more positive impact (Olsen, et al., 
2010, p.457). Collective responsibility acknowledged by TCs makes society more aware 
of past atrocities and less likely to repeat them (Olsen, et al., 2010). Cited in Olsen, et al., 
(2010), David Mendeloff (2004) suggests that looking at human rights improvements 
does not represent an appropriate measure of the success of TCs (p.459). TCs do have 
many goals besides promoting human rights, such as justice, economic improvement or 
changing perceptions abroad, which can indirectly affect human rights. For Kathryn 
Sikkink as cited in Olsen, et al., (2010), there are three explanations for TC success in 
human rights improvement. TCs outline weaknesses in institutional structures to be 
changed; promote accountability; legitimize cultures, beliefs and values associated with 
human rights (p.461). TCs can provide a “blueprint” for reform that could improve 
human rights protections (Olsen, et al., 2010). Weibelhaus-Brahm found qualitative 
evidence that human rights tend to improve when TCs are used with other mechanisms. 
A study concluded, “that truth commissions, when used in concert with trials and 
amnesties, can help provide a ‘justice balance’ that contributes to human rights 
improvements” (Olsen, et al., 2010, p. 458). A mixed response is the best remedy. 
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h) History 
TCs have to contend with the constraints of history. According to Tristram Hunt (2004) 
in Hayner (2011), TCs are historical events, rather than historical sources (p.84). Many 
view TCs as a useful mechanism to preserve the past and collective memory. However, 
developing a collective past may not reconcile society (Gutman and Thompson, 2000). 
History tends to be written by the victors and is often therefore biased. TCs focus on the 
experience of victims, which can change the focus of history to victimhood rather than 
rights (Minow, 1998, p.80). It is a political exercise and can become a tool to advance a 
certain political objective (Minow, 1998). By denying the existence of events and 
covering up history or blaming others, regime supporters curtail the right to the truth, and 
manipulate national identities limiting reconciliation (Kritz, 1995). There is competition 
to control the writing of history (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). Most scholars stress the 
importance of forming a historical record that is as complete and unbiased as possible 
(Zalaquett, 1989). Knowing the past and having consensus over it can uphold national 
identities (Baehr, 2007, p.6). Developing a historical narrative is a difficult political 
endeavor and incomplete process. 
 
TCs investigate human rights violations that occurred in the past, covering the period of 
repression. For Freeman (2006), TCs that investigate a period longer than a generation 
ago are historical. It is necessary to acknowledge responsibility for past abuses and 
preserve historical memory (ICTJ, 2009, p.41). If an injustice was done to a group, it 
becomes a significant part of their historical and group identity. In order to reconcile, 
perpetrators and governments must respond in a way that respects what that history 
means to the victims (Thompson, 2008). Victims have a right to decide the means in 
which their narratives are developed and conveyed (James, 2012, p.192). The history of 
human rights abuses influences victims and survivors, and can become an essential part 
to the truth-seeking reconciliation efforts. 
 
TCs must look into the past to address human rights abuses, and sometimes change the 
historical narrative to rectify them. This is difficult and can have political and social 
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implications. Dealing with historical injustices is an obligation of citizens, not necessarily 
descendants (Freeman, 2008). It is difficult to determine the culpability of later 
generations who had no role in the initial violations (Freeman, 2008). Yet, one way to 
address historical injustices is through intergenerational justice measures such as 
apologies (Howard-Hassman and Gibney, 2008). For Kritz, as cited by Thompson 
(2008), citizens, “should recognize the responsibility of their state, as a transgenerational 
polity, to recompense victims for a history of injustice and disrespect” (p.40). It is 
important that historical violations are investigated. 
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IV. Case Studies 
The TCs presented here share some characteristics with the earlier, traditional TCs, but 
focus on different methods and practices. These recent commissions learned from the 
experiences of past efforts and created organizations that fit their national context. 
Scholars of transitional studies tend to focus on the earlier TCs because the passage of 
time has allowed analysis of effects. This is necessary since many of the changes 
commissions recommend take years to occur. However, TCs can miss lessons learned 
and transition efforts by not studying past commissions. At least forty TCs have occurred 
since 1974, with over half since 1999 (Hayner, 2011, p.xiv). The South Korean and 
Canadian efforts deal with the historical legacy of human rights abuses on culture and 
politics. These national processes also show a geographic diversity from Northeast Asia 
and North America, adding a new perspective to the more studied TCs of Africa and 
Latin America. Studying the spread of TCs in different contexts can show that TCs in 
various cultural and political contexts is possible. Reconciliation is a goal of these 
commissions and how effective they are at reaching that goal depends on their methods, 
recommendations and relationship with society. 
 
A) South Korea 
a. Background 
The politicized historical narrative and the effects of previous regimes had a significant 
impact on South Korea (Yoneyama, 2010, p.666). Under Japanese colonial control by 
1910, Korea later became a stage for Cold War tensions between the USSR and the USA 
in the post-WWII period. The Cold War anti-communist stance of the South Korean 
dictatorships was to “indoctrinate its people with an anticommunist ideology and 
violently enforced through legal means” (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.527). The crisis of the 
war and armistice evoked “a sense of insecurity [that] in turn necessitated and justified 
violent measures taken to restore security” (Suh, 2010, p.511). Military dictatorships 
lasted until the 1980s and were characterized by coups, massacres and show trials for 
suspected communists and dissidents (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). It was only after 
democratization that there was a chance to address the past human rights violations (Suh, 
2010, p.511). 
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The emergence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Committee on Clearing Up 
Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation) (TRCK) in South Korea came after a long 
period of attempts to challenge the state for information and accountability. The TRCK 
was not a result of a regime change, but evolved from social and intellectual movements, 
and pressure from victims associations (Yoneyama, 2010, p.658). There were several 
opportunities to address the human rights abuses of previous regimes or leaders (Dong-
Choon, 2010a). In 1948 a Special Act on Punishing Anti-national Conducts was passed, 
establishing a committee to investigate pro-Japanese collaborators. This committee did 
not last long and was undermined by the Rhee government’s re-hiring of officials from 
the colonial period (TRCK, 2009, p.6). When the Rhee regime was toppled, victims’ 
families were able to create the National Association of the Bereaved Families of the 
Korean War Victims and challenge the official discourse about the war (Dong-Choon, 
2010a, p.531). In May 1960, a Special Committee on the Fact-finding of Massacres was 
created, but only lasted 11 days (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.532). The 1961 military coup put 
an end to fact-finding efforts.  
 
Prior to the political transition in the late 1980s, the government granted amnesty to 
political prisoners and human rights abusers. Despite the death penalty convictions of 
former dictators Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan in 1988 for the 1980 Gwangju 
massacre, both were pardoned by President Kim Young Sam (Olsen, et al., 2010, p.472). 
A law was passed to compensate victims of the massacre, but there was no investigation, 
and mid-level commanders and lower were not held accountable (Dong-Choon, 2010a, 
p.537). The new democratic regime created a Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths of the Republic of Korea in 2000, and other commissions, that showed 
the need for a more comprehensive settlement of the past (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.543). 
All of these incidents led to the eventual formation of the TRCK. 
 
The TRCK addressed the trauma of loss and persecution that prevented families of 
victims from telling their story or having their suffering acknowledged (Soehendro, 2009; 
Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.525). Previous efforts to deal with human rights violations show 
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“that individual human rights abuses and large-scale atrocities all had immense political 
and historical significance and that civilian mass killings during conflicts can be settled 
if” there is public support (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.543). South Korea resembled many 
Latin America, African and Asian countries that had endured US-backed dictators during 
the Cold War (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.527). However, the South Korean situation was 
unique because of the influence of Japanese occupation, the Korean War and the 
continued tensions between North and South Korea (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.527). 
Experiences in South Africa, Chile, Germany, Spain and Argentina provided some 
guidance for the TRCK as it attempted to address the past and build a common future, in 
spite of political divisions (TRCK, 2009, p.5; Dong-Choon and Seldon, 2010). 
 
b) TRC Korea 
i. Mandate 
The mandate called for the investigation of incidents of human rights abuses, violence, 
and massacres that occurred from Japanese rule to present (USIP, 2011b). There was a 
concerted effort to uncover as many state abuses as possible (Dong-Choon, 2010a, 
p.545). Specifically, the mandate covered illegal massacres before and after the Korean 
War, “human rights violations due to constitutional and legal violations or unlawful 
exercise of authority, incidents involving suspicious manipulation of the truth, and other 
historical incidents” (TRCK, 2009, p.8). The TRCK suggested bringing justice to pro-
Japanese supporters from the colonial era, restoring victims honor from massacres and 
verifying facts from abuses during the democratization process (TRCK, 2009, p.9). Most 
of the cases covered by the TRCK were from the Korean War (1950-1953). A significant 
goal was governmental acknowledgement of the truth and for society to accept it (TRCK, 
2009, p.3). “The chief task of the Commission was truth confirmation by an objective 
process of investigations and deliberation” (Suh, 2010, p.521). The TRCK wanted “to 
create favorable conditions for achieving historical, political and legal justice through 
revealing long-suppressed truths” and to challenge the mainstream narrative of the 
Korean War (Dong-Choon and Seldon, 2010). The TRCK also believed that the 
establishment of a TC would assist in bringing forgiveness and lead to reconciliation 
 33 
(TRCK, 2009, p.8). There was a clear emphasis is on educating the public about the 
history of state abuses. 
 
ii. Activities 
Of the commissioners, eight were appointed by parliament, four by the president and 
three by the chief justice- each for two-year terms (USIP, 2011b). The composition of the 
commission suggested an effort to create a politically independent, unbiased body to 
ensure legitimacy. The TRCK had limited investigative authority and could summon 
witnesses, but not force cooperation and had no legal power to obtain documents (Dong-
Choon, 2010a, p.546). All conclusions had to be accepted by a majority of the 
commissioners, which made consensus difficult (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.548). 
Applications were divided into three committees: independence movements, human 
rights abuses and massacres (TRCK, 2009, p.20). 
 
The TRCK carried out various activities to pursue its mandate from December 2005 until 
December 2010. They screened each petition, investigated and decided on cases and 
recommended measures to assist in truth and reconciliation (USIP, 2011b).  
Recommendations were not binding and not enforceable (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.546; 
TRCK, 2009, p.32). At the beginning, efforts were taken to focus on raising public 
awareness and instituting an operational framework, which then led to investigations 
(TRCK, 2009, p.102). The TRCK had a quarterly newsletter to keep interested parties up 
to date and a report every six months for raising public awareness (Hayner, 2011, p.65; 
TRCK, 2009, p.8). The TRCK also did some international networking activities through 
press conferences, communicating with other truth seeking bodies and holding two 
international forums (TRCK, 2009, p.43). The committee also confirmed massacres, 
documented memorial efforts and investigated US troop incidents (Hayner, 2011, p.65). 
After the confirmation of one massacre, President Roh Moo-Hyun made an official 
apology for that specific incident (Hayner, 2011). The TRCK also collaborated with other 
South Korean truth-finding organizations and regional entities, as well as with bereaved 
families and relevant organizations to increase efficiency and avoid redundancy. They 
held events including joint memorial services and a reconciliation convention to try and 
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involve society in the process (TRCK, 2009, p.47). These activities were not widely 
publicized because cooperation with the media was difficult. There was some reporting 
regarding massacres. Exhumation work was a significant part of discovering forensic 
truth and group interviews were recorded and documented (TRCK, 2009, pp.38-39). 
Fact-finding was an essential component to the TRCKs work since in most cases since 
petitioners were elders and time was limited (TRCK, 2009, p.28). 
 
By the end of the TRCK’s mandate, the political climate had become unfavorable to truth 
seeking efforts. The newly elected Conservative Party was “uncomfortable with the 
strong conclusions in the report” and in holding “prior rightist governments to be 
responsible for abuses” (Hayner, 2011, p.66; Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). Some of the 
new leaders had directly or indirectly benefited from the legacy of authoritarian rule 
(Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.548). Thus, there was little interest for those in power to 
investigate the past (Hayner, 2011, p.66). The new chair and standing commissioners 
“were hostile to the spirit of the commission”, even going as far to ban publication of the 
English text of the 2009 summary report (Dong-Choon and Shelden, 2010). 
 
iii. Types of Violations 
Violations to the right to life by the state and armed forces made up a significant number 
of the human rights abuses investigated. In South Korea, an infringement of human rights 
is considered death, serious injury or disappearance, while the TRCK added illegal 
detention and abuse of victims in court cases (TRCK, 2009, p.82). The TRCK 
emphasized how the victims in South Korea were killed three times: first, in massacres, 
second, when requests for investigations by bereaved families were disregarded and lastly 
when family members were branded communists by association (Dong-Choon, 2010b). 
“The authorities systematically alienated the bereaved families from civil society by 
placing them under constant surveillance by the police and the KCIA and then leaking the 
facts to their neighbors,” which traumatized survivors and kept civil society from calling 
for accountability (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.541). Victims included political prisoners, 
members of the Bodo League, suspected North Korean collaborators and civilians and 
refugees caught in the war (Soehendro, 2009). The threat of communism was consistently 
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used as justification for violating human rights (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.527). The coup in 
1961 led to torture, fabricated espionage charges and suspicious deaths (Dong-Choon, 
2010a, p.535). Besides violations of the right to life through massacres, death sentences, 
torture and assassinations, there were also property rights violations, lack of due process 
for illegally charged individuals, and blocked educational opportunities (TRCK, 2009, 
p.30). The violations affected future generations, continuing the violations, which was a 
significant reason for the TRCK’s existence. 
 
iv. Findings 
The TRCK understood the violations as connected to past events. They viewed the 
Korean War as an outcome of Japanese colonialism, post-liberation dictatorial regimes, 
anti-communism and the expansion of American power (Yoneyama, 2010, p.658). They 
worked to identify and classify the shifting political and military conditions that led to 
various forms of mass civilian killings and human rights abuses in order to understand the 
conditions in which violations occurred (Yoneyama, 2010, p.656). The TRCK found that 
mass killings were committed by North Korean military, South Korean military and US 
Armed Forces (USIP, 2011b). The TRC estimated that as many as 100,000 South 
Koreans died at the hands of the government (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). The 
“investigations call into question the very cultural assumptions, intellectual premises, and 
relations of power, according to which a history of the war and its meaning have been 
narrated and accepted as truth” (Yoneyama, 2010, p.655). 
 
v. Historical Legacy 
Controlling the historical narrative has kept human rights abuses from being known, thus 
limiting the truth and healing. The official history, known as yugio, portrays South Korea 
as the victim, North Korea as the aggressor and the US as the savior (Suh, 2010, p.507). 
The regimes of the 1960s “helped create and spread the new political myth that South 
Korea was reborn in its fight against international communism”, which has become 
accepted truth (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.535). In order to change the historical narrative it 
is important to understand the political context it was created in (Dong-Choon, 2010a, 
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p.540). “The historical contention over the Korean War constitutes such a political 
struggle for the future” and is ongoing (Suh, 2010, p.503). 
 
vi. Recommendations 
The TRC recommended to the state a policy of memorialization, events, establishing 
historical records and monuments and furthering peace education (USIP, 2011b). Other 
recommendations were laws for reparations and medical services and that the falsely 
accused get a new trial (USIP, 2011b). For the massacres, an official state apology, 
revision of family registers, memorial events, additions or revisions regarding historical 
records, peace and human rights education, revision of related laws and medical subsidies 
were suggested (TRCK, 2009, p.32). For victims of US violations, the TRCK 
recommended an official apology from the US, a memorial event and for the US to 
provide compensation to the victims’ families (TRCK, 2009, p.32). Due to political 
realities, it is not feasible for the US to compensate victims since they are not likely to 
accept guilt. For groups that opposed the Republic of Korea’s legitimacy the TRCK 
suggested similar measures, including archiving incidents as historical record (TRCK, 
2009, p.32). For human rights abuses the TRCK advised a state apology, retrial, medical 
services, deletion of records and damage reparation (TRCK, 2009, p.33). The 
recommendations focused on history and the specific violations, rather than wider 
societal remedies. 
 
c) Reconciliation 
Partial apologies and legal procedures were the main reconciliatory efforts done by the 
state. In 2008, President Ro Moo-Hyun apologized on behalf of the nation for illegal 
activities committed by state officials in connection to the Bodo League massacres and 
for the massacres that occurred during the Korean War (TRCK, 2009, p.102; USIP, 
2011b; Dong-Choon, 2010b). Reexamining court cases provided some measure of legal 
and political reconciliation (TRCK, 2009, p.102). Taking direct legal action was not an 
option for most violations due to their scale, the amount of time passed and the deaths of 
most perpetrators (Dong-Choon and Selden, 2010). The Ministry of National Defense 
presented a floral garland and expressed regret to the families, but did not make any 
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official efforts to apologize or reconcile, which is ineffective in the long term (TRCK, 
2009, p.50). For Dong-Choon, one of the commissioners, “establishing the truth and 
rehabilitating victims’ reputations was the primary task and the foundation for 
reconciliation” (Dong-Choon and Selden, 2010). He continued: 
By airing the truth of the Korean War, determining what really happened and who 
were the perpetrators and the victims, I hoped that social awareness about Korean 
War massacres and atrocities could be enhanced. This would make it possible 
both to provide a form of social punishment to perpetrators, including those 
named and those unnamed, while restoring the legitimacy of victims (Dong-
Choon and Selden, 2010). 
 
At the time of the negotiations for the TRCK, no naming in the final report was allowed 
as a compromise between political parties (Dong-Choon and Selden, 2010). The media 
ignored and even suppressed findings, providing little coverage of activities and focusing 
on the failures rather than successes (Dong-Choon and Selden, 2010). For some, little 
reconciliation was achieved and “the TRCK accomplished little: no perpetrators nor any 
responsible state institution ever apologized for past misdeeds” (Dong-Choon, 2010a, 
p.547). The TRCK did not specify between whom the reconciliation was supposed to be, 
which led to a focus on forensic truth to promote reconciliation (Dong-Choon, 2010a, 
p.547). There was some justice when cases involving the judiciary as the perpetrator were 
addressed and decisions were reversed where the TRCK had verified the truth (Dong-
Choon, 2010a, p.549). The TRCK was able to change the dialogue and direction of 
discussion about the Korean War and many petitioners were relieved that a government 
institution was paying attention to them (Dong-Choon, 2010a, p.549). There was a 
recommendation follow-up board created in 2007 to work on recommendations the 
TRCK made on individual cases (USIP, 2011b). Implementing recommendations and 
supporting reconciliation measures is an on-going process. 
 
d) Society’s Response 
Public opinion was divided over the truth and reconciliation process. Korean society was 
split into three groups; those who saw it as an important process, those who thought it 
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was bad for democratic development and those who thought the process was started 
before society was ready (Olsen, et al., 2010, p.473). A division also exists between the 
victims and survivors who mobilized for justice and truth seeking, and others who credit 
the military regime for South Korea’s development and high standards of living (Olsen, 
et al., 2010). This division is exacerbated since “[m]uch of the commission’s politically 
charged work has been ignored by the South Korean government, which has rarely issued 
apologies for past atrocities” (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). Most of the government’s 
concern is focused on the constant tensions with the North. Despite the government’s 
negative perception and lack of action, “the commission’s investigations still help[ed] the 
government build credibility with a public that has had little faith in its leaders” because 
of the extent of the human rights abuses committed (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). 
Despite the tense political nature and two different groups of commissioners, the TRC 
was able to remain politically neutral in its investigations (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010).  
 
The studies and information gathered are significant because it supported a different 
version of history (Rowland and Hae-Rym, 2010). In order to continue the TRCK’s 
efforts, a Forum on Truth and Justice was created by citizens and supported by activists 
and former TRCK staff (Dong-Choon and Selden, 2010). Many of the TRCK’s 
accomplishments have been put on hold or terminated by the conservative government 
(Suh, 2010, p.521). Some have questioned looking into past violations when South Korea 
is now a wealthy democracy (Cain, 2009). Despite these difficulties, Chairperson Dong-
Choon suggested that the airing of citizen’s grievances is a form of democratization from 
below and allows for a new opening for achieving human rights in South Korea (Dong-
Choon and Selden, 2010). Addressing the legacy of human rights abuses in South Korea 
was partially effective, but limited by political realities. 
 
B. Canada 
a. Background 
Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), begun in 2009 and scheduled to 
last until 2014, addresses the human rights violations that occurred in the aboriginal 
schools. The aboriginal school system started in 1874 and did not end until 1996 (Hayner, 
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2011). The schools were government-funded and church-led, with the goal of 
assimilating aboriginal children into Canadian mainstream society by removing parental 
and community involvement in the intellectual, cultural and spiritual development of the 
children (TRC, 2012). This system is not unique to Canada, as similar schools existed in 
the United States and Australia. These schools had a profound impact on generations of 
students. 
 
The legacy of colonization, discrimination and human rights abuses against aboriginal 
Canadians underlines the residential school system. In 1991, a Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples held hearings on how to improve relations with aboriginal people, 
including the legacy of the schools (TRC, 2012, p.22). In the mid-1990s, thousands of 
former students look legal action against the church and federal government. In 1998, the 
government acknowledged the failure of the school policy (Hayner, 2011). This led to the 
2007 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. Under court supervision, this 
agreement focused on repairing harm done by the schools (TRC, 2012, p.1). There were 
also “common experience” payments up to $28,000 for each student (Hayner, 2011). It 
came about because all parties in the dispute were dissatisfied with the adversarial nature 
and slow pace of the justice system and shared “the longstanding desire of victims for a 
broader societal focus on their experiences” (James, 2012, p.189). The TRC is more 
about conveying the victim’s experience and truth than the victims learning new 
information (James, 2012, p.200). Like the TRCK, the victims know their truth, and try to 
convey it to the rest of society. 
 
b) TRC  
i. Description, Mandate 
The TRC was established by an order-in-council in June 2008, is led by three chairs and 
is supported by an advisory council of ten former residential school students and an Inuit 
sub-commission. The head office is in Winnipeg, Manitoba with offices of varying sizes 
throughout Canada, providing for wide geographical reach that allows for more coverage 
and wider involvement (TRC, 2012, p.3). The TRC is unique in that it is one of the first 
commissions to address human rights violations that span over a century and addresses 
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the abuses against aboriginal children (TRC, 2012, p.10). It is also recognized as the first 
TC established as part of a judicial agreement rather than by legislation or decree (ICTJ, 
2008). 
 
One of the main goals of the TRC is to overturn assumptions of the general population 
(James, 2012, p.192). The purpose is to reveal the “complex truth about the history and 
the on-going legacy” of the residential schools through documenting the individual and 
collective harms, and honoring the survivors, “leading toward reconciliation within 
Aboriginal families, and between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal communities, 
churches, governments, and Canadians generally” (TRC, 2012, p.1). With five years, and 
a $60 million budget, the TRC has significant time and resources to work (TRC, 2012, 
p.2). A limitation is that the TRC cannot associate any individual with conclusions or 
findings, in events or activities, unless guilt has already been established through legal 
proceedings or by admission or public disclosure by the individual (Hayner, 2011). 
 
ii. Activities 
The commissioners began by attending events planned by survivors and aboriginal 
groups (TRC, 2012, p.4). Other activities involved pubic education by attending 
conferences of aboriginal organizations and churches and speaking at over 200 
conferences between 2009 and 2012 (TRC, 2012, p.4). By the end of September 2011, 
the commissioners had met with former students in every province and territory (TRC, 
2012, p.4). The commissioners also attended a forum on Native American boarding 
schools in the US and met with representatives of the Shiah Foundation in Los Angeles, 
California to gain insight into recording, preserving and using oral histories for education 
purposes (TRC, 2012, p.11). The TRC also conducted research into prior reconciliation 
efforts, such as the 1991 Royal Commission. These activities provided important 
background for their work. 
 
One of the main priorities for the TRC was to meet with former students. The TRC views 
statement giving “as a means to restore dignity and identity to those who have suffered 
grievous harms,” an important part of the truth-seeking efforts (TRC, 2012, p.12). There 
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were trained statement gatherers that recorded biographies of school survivors to be kept 
in a planned National Research Centre (TRC, 2012, p.12). The survivors had the option 
of having a health or cultural support worker or therapist present and a choice of giving 
an audio or visual recording (TRC, 2012, p.12). They could give testimony in public 
sharing circles, hearings at a scheduled location or private sessions (TRC, 2012, p.13). In 
total, the TRC completed 400 outreach and statement gathering initiatives up until 2012 
(TRC, 2012, p.14). The TRCs interview techniques are highly supportive and sensitive to 
the needs of school survivors. 
 
Document collection is another facet to the TRC’s work. By 2012, the TRC was in the 
process of developing a database and assembling a team of historical researchers to 
review and audit holdings (TRC, 2012, p.13). Despite their efforts, there was significant 
lack of cooperation by the federal government and historical and church archives (TRC, 
2012, p.16). The TRC has been provided with a limited amount of the relevant 
documents by the government and is not allowed to access documents related to the 
Settlement Agreement and Dispute Resolution database (TRC, 2012, p.16). Churches 
have imposed restrictions and conditions in order to access or copy materials as well 
(TRC, 2012, p.16). The Settlement Agreement says the state and churches must bear the 
cost for document reproduction, but the government has not provided enough money for 
the TRC to accomplish this task. There is some political reticence to the aims of the TRC. 
 
The TRC also carried out or plans to carry out several other initiatives. One is the missing 
children and unmarked grave project to document the unknown fate of children (TRC, 
2012, p.17). Another is a national research center to establish a national memory and to 
be accessible to all (TRC, 2012, p.17). Commemoration is also important to the 
reconciliation process and requires direct participation from communities. The survivor 
committee reviews proposals to fund commemoration projects that intend to honor, 
validate, heal or memorialize the residential school experience. The mandate required 
seven national events to be held within the first two years of the TRC, along with a 
closing ceremony at the end in an effort to reach as many Canadians as possible (TRC, 
2012, p.18). The TRC also funded documentary films about the schools, conducted 
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workshops, museum and photography exhibits, quilting projects, group simulation 
games, teaching modules, wilderness retreats, webcasts, blogs and interactive websites 
(James, 2012, p.201). These efforts attempt to involve as much of society as possible. 
 
iii. Types of Violations 
The human rights abuses suffered by the residential school students were physical, as 
well as psychological. The Law Commission of Canada, a federal advisory board, 
concluded that the schools reflected genocidal intent by removing children from the 
communities and culture, a severe violation (James, 2008, p.140). Most children lost their 
identity by being separated from their culture and losing their names, which today is 
recognized as a right to have (TRC, 2012, p.5). There was “deprivation of language and 
culture, imposition of religious practices, and physical and sexual misconduct by teachers 
and boarding-home parents or supervisors” (TRC, 2012, p.9). Survivors told the TRC 
about widespread diseases, suicides and unexplained deaths (TRC, 2012, p.5). The legacy 
of the abuses suffered by students continued beyond school. Students were unable to 
develop social or parenting skills and were without community and culture for support. 
“This legacy from one generation to the next has contributed to social problems, poor 
health, and low educational success rates in Aboriginal communities today” (TRC, 2012, 
p.1). For former students, the residential schools “are not part of the past, but vivid 
elements of their daily life” (TRC, 2012, p.6). Addressing these historical and continuing 
violations is essential for improving relations with indigenous communities. 
 
iv. Interim Conclusions and Recommendations 
Although the TRC is still working, they have come to some interim conclusions. There is 
a general agreement that the residential school system was “an assault on Aboriginal 
children, families and culture” and against self-governing aboriginal nations (TRC, 2012, 
p.25). The abuses had a severe impact on aboriginal peoples and cultures that have been 
carried through generations (TRC, 2012, p.25). It has also become clear that Canadians 
have not received a thorough education about aboriginal society, culture, history and the 
relationship with non-aboriginals (TRC, 2012, p.25). 
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The recommendations made by the TRC in the Interim Report focused on greater support 
for the TRCs work, as well as reconciliation efforts. For the functioning of the TRC, 
more time and more funds were recommended in order to carry out the mandate 
effectively and the government to provide all relevant documents (TRC, 2012, p.28). The 
government should establish resources for a sustainable mental health and wellness 
center in the north where most people have limited access to health facilities, as well as 
centers throughout the country specializing in the trauma and grief counseling for the 
treatment of residential school survivors to assist with the healing process (TRC, 2012, 
p.28). Education was another important part of the TRCs recommendations. They called 
for a review of curriculum for teaching about residential schools and to develop materials 
to do so (TRC, 2012, p.28). Educational measures also include a public education 
campaign for the general population. The TRC recommends the government and 
churches establish a revival fund for projects that promote traditional spiritual, cultural 
and linguistic heritage as a reparative measure (TRC, 2012, p.28). The TRC also suggests 
developing early childhood and parenting programs for school survivors to tackle the 
legacy of social violations (TRC, 2012, p.28). An important recommendation by the TRC 
is including survivors who feel excluded from the agreement and process (TRC, 2012, 
p.29). The TRC also recommends that the government distribute copies of the Statement 
of Apology, since many of the survivors they talked to were unaware of its content (TRC, 
2012, p.29). Lastly, the TRC suggested using the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as a framework for working towards on-going reconciliation between 
aboriginals and non-aboriginals (TRC, 2012, p.29). 
 
c. Apology 
In 1998, there was a statement of apology that most native leaders rejected (TRC, 2012; 
James, 2008). It was not part of the official parliamentary record, and it failed to mention 
the purpose of the schools or acknowledge the effects on the students or the intentions 
behind the policy (James, 2008). The first official apology took place in May 2007 in the 
House of Commons and then on 11 June 2008, the Prime Minister of Canada issued the 
“Statement of Apology to Former Students of Indian Residential Schools” (Hayner, 2011; 
TRC, 2012, p.9). Not all the survivors accepted this apology, but many told the TRC that 
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the apology was important for their healing (TRC, 2012, p.9). There is also limited 
awareness of the actual wording of the apology, which limits its effects (TRC, 2012, p.9). 
The apology left out the suffering of parents and was more of “a ‘sorry for what 
happened to you’ than a ‘sorry for what I did’” (James, 2012, p.203). The apology was 
important, but still not enough for reconciliation. 
 
d. Reconciliation  
The TRC has moved toward engaging all Canadians in discussions about the importance 
and meaning of reconciliation. The Canadian government has attempted to use 
reparations, the TRC, commemoration and an official apology to address the legacy of 
the residential schools (Jung, 2009). In 2010, the TRC even co-hosted a youth retreat to 
tackle these issues (TRC, 2012, p.4, p.10). The TRC views former students as “the 
impetus for bringing forth reconciliation” and that such resolution ”will come through the 
education system” (TRC, 2012, p.6, p.7). Survivors want their languages, traditions and 
respect. They also desire institutions to invest in restoring their culture and for the history 
of the residential school system to be taught to all Canadians (TRC, 2012, p.7). 
Compensation has also been an issue, as it is restricted to former students or residents of 
schools listed in the Settlement Agreement, which left out many schools (TRC, 2012, 
p.9). “The exclusion of these students is a serious roadblock to meaningful and sincere 
reconciliation” (TRC, 2012, p.9). Involving the former students in the process reverses 
the symbolic power relations, giving them agency and the power to reconcile (James, 
2012, p.183). There is a clear need for improved relations between indigenous 
communities and the government. 
 
The TRC acknowledges that the commission alone is not enough to bring about 
reconciliation, although it is an essential first step (TRC, 2012, p.26; James, 2012, p.199). 
It requires the commitment of individuals and the involvement of society (TRC, 2012, 
p.26). “Reconciliation also will require change in the relationship between Aboriginal 
people and the government of Canada” (TRC, 2012, p.27). The goals of the indigenous 
population and the government clash, with different perspectives over the scope of 
injustices. The government differentiates between the past and present policy, while the 
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indigenous population uses the present to critique past policy (Jung, 2009). It is also not 
just the government and the aboriginal communities addressing reconciliation, but 
churches and their role in abuses (TRC, 2012, p.6). According to Chairperson Sinclair, 
“the supposed truths of indigenous inferiority and European superiority taught in both 
systems continue to remain imposing barriers to reconciliation” (James, 2012, p.196). 
However, “conceptions of reconciliation that emphasize face-to-face understanding, 
healing and forgiveness may be similarly unable to do justice to the political and 
economic concerns of the indigenous communities” on issues other than the residential 
school system (James, 2012, p.199). 
 
e. Society’s Response 
Some see Canada’s use of apologies and reparations as a way to lessen the government’s 
obligations and limit future indigenous demands (Jung, 2009). Rather than addressing the 
aboriginal demands for education, housing, social welfare and health, the government’s 
relationship with aboriginals consists of economic development on reserves and 
exploitation of resources (Jung, 2009). “From the perspective of indigenous people, 
transitional justice measures should be designed to open up political space and to extend 
government responsibility beyond residential school survivors alone” (Jung, 2009). It 
also provided the chance for the aboriginals to draw on international law, conventions 
and declarations to make the state take responsibility (Jung, 2009). Now there are three 
times as many aboriginal children in child welfare agencies care as there were at the 
height of the residential schools (Jung, 2009). Despite its strengths, the TRC for some 
“fosters the absence of a more detailed and accountability-promoting examination of the 
agents and institutions responsible for the injustices” (James, 2012, p.182). The mandate 
has been identified as weak in regards to political accountability since there is no naming-
which, in the Canadian context, would not threaten the stability of the government 
(James, 2012, p.190). “A more aggressively fault-finding focus on these acts and 
decisions might serve more effectively to confront Canadians with their historical and on-
going complicity in the residential schools agenda” (James, 2012, p.202). It has also been 
difficult for the TRC to raise awareness despite best efforts (TRC, 2012, p.9). The 
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different political motives and lack of accountability measures limits the improvement 
the TRC is capable of promoting. 
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V. Conclusion 
These TCs have focused on changing societal perceptions and knowledge of the past. 
This can be successful through legitimating practices. Reconciliation also relies on the 
relationship between the victims, state and society. Earlier traditional TCs covered 
violations that occurred relatively recently by repressive regimes and focused on 
violations of civil and political rights.   
 
The reconciliation efforts led by these commissions have employed various ways to 
address past human rights abuses. They show the importance of the societies’ 
involvement in the process. Civil society organizations played a significant role in 
establishing South Korea’s TRCK, and for providing information. Canada’s TRC uses 
community established events and projects to support its reconciliation initiative. Some 
of the most successful measures of these TCs have been because they are victim centered. 
They all recognize the effects of past human rights violations and, through interviews and 
consultations, make an effort to address them. The two TCs discussed built upon previous 
reconciliation efforts in their countries, which highlights that reconciliation is a process 
that takes time. These TCs also contribute to TC study by focusing on historical 
violations that widen the types of violations addressed. The political and economic 
stability of these two countries enhanced their commissions’ abilities to thoroughly 
investigate and have legitimacy.  
 
Specifically, each TC contributed a new policy or practice and enhanced previous efforts’ 
transitional justice measures. For South Korea, their historical work focused on violations 
that occurred during wartime and repressive political rule. The TRCK is important to 
evolving TC work because it not only addressed violations carried out by its own state, 
but also by other international actors. The emphasis on changing the historical narrative 
to change society is also important and shows how the past directly influences the 
present. Canada’s TRC shows that TCs can be established in peaceful, wealthy societies 
to address past abuses against citizens. The use of events and interviews covering the 
entire country is important for future TCs to understand the importance of reaching out to 
as many people as possible for societal reconciliation. They share similar processes with 
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other TCs, but the historical perspective of human rights violations on society sets them 
apart. 
 
Despite their contributions to TC development, these commissions are still problematic. 
It is not possible to have perfect commissions since the effects of their efforts cannot be 
immediately known. The lack of institutional accountability in these commissions is 
discouraging. Due to the historical nature of their investigations, one of the only possible 
ways to redress the past abuses is by having the institutions who perpetrated the 
violations take responsibility. Besides the government, that has yet to happen from other 
institutions, such as the military in Korea and federal institutions in Canada. The issue of 
reconciliation requires significant time to fix. Addressing economic, social and cultural 
issues needs to also be a priority since they are consistently used in reparative measures. 
Without considering the violations of these rights, the reconciliation cannot be complete. 
The nature of the TRCK’s and TRC’s investigations do to some extent address the social, 
economic and cultural right violations suffered by communities in their countries.  
 
Canada’s narrow focus on the residential school system limits reconciliation since 
contemporary violations are not addressed. South Korea still retains political divisions 
and general positive perceptions of past regimes that contributed to economic 
development despite violations. Proper reconciliation requires the attempted resolution of 
all issues affecting all parties. In the immediate aftermath of conflict or transitions, there 
are usually obvious issues that must be addressed. However, with historical abuses, the 
results and effects of the initial abuses have caused and exacerbated other abuses; not just 
the current violations need to be acknowledged, but also the initial harms.  For all TCs, 
including these two, carrying out the recommendations made by the TC is important. 
This may take time to implement, as well as to see the effects, but they cannot be ignored.  
 
By addressing historical human rights violations, these TCs expand the applicability of 
TC work. The legacy of historical human rights abuses can limit the advancement and 
development of a society. By not addressing them, states enable the continuation of those 
violations as well as allowing new abuses. Though it has yet to occur fully in the two 
 49 
cases discussed above, by encouraging societal involvement, carrying out reparations and 
recommendations and acknowledging accountability, stable and peaceful societies can 
address historical human rights violations. 
 
Word Count: 15,225 
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